Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2026: Can an Expanded Bench Strength Effectively Reduce Judicial Pendency in India?

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2026 increased the number of judges in the Supreme Court from 33 to 37 judges (excluding the Chief Justice of India). The objective is to reduce the backlog of cases. However, merely increasing the number of judges will not reduce the backlog of cases if new cases are filed as fast as, or faster than, they are disposed of. This raises the central question of whether the amendment will actually help reduce the backlog of cases or address a different institutional need.

In light of the 2019 amendment, which increased the sanctioned strength from 30 to 33 judges, this blog argues that the success of the 2026 amendment will depend on timely appointments, adequate infrastructure, and sufficient increases in disposal capacity to close the institution disposal gap. Thus, the impact of the amendment should be assessed on the basis of its ability to close the institution disposal gap, rather than on sanctioned strength or pendency alone.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

The strength of the Supreme Court is constitutionally determined under Article 124(1), which empowers Parliament to determine its strength through legislation, and Parliament has[1] done so from time to time; most recently, the number of judges was increased from 30 to 33 (excluding the CJI) in 2019 through an amendment to the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956[2].

Sanctioned Strength Does Not Necessarily Reflect Effective Capacity.

The Supreme Court in the All-India Judges’ Association v. Union of India[3],recognised that enhancing strength requires not only creating new posts but also adequate infrastructure and filling vacancies. The underlying principle of the Rate of Disposal Method is that it measures a judge’s average rate of case disposal and uses this figure to assess how many judges are necessary to maintain requisite clearance levels while simultaneously addressing both newly instituted cases and existing backlog4. Thus, the mere sanctioning of additional posts does not guarantee a reduction in pendency.

The second requirement is also reflected in All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247, where the Supreme Court stated that, merely creating additional posts is not sufficient to increase the effective strength of the judiciary. The Court held that it is equally important to provide new court rooms, buildings and supporting staff to ensure that additional judges are working effectively. The Court further observed that vacancies within the existing sanctioned strength may remain unfilled, indicating that the creation of sanctioned posts alone is insufficient to ensure judicial capacity.[5] The importance of a well organised and systematic process for filling judicial vacancies so that there are no delays in recruitment was underlined by the Supreme Court in the case of Malik Mazhar Sultan v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission. The court further stated that a proper system must be established to identify and notify vacancies in timely manner and the process of selection and appointment must be completed in accordance with fixed timelines.[6] It follows that the additional posts created by the recent amendment can contribute to reducing backlog only after they are duly filled. All these cases create a three-part test as to whether the 2026 amendment will be able to be turned into an effective instrument:

(i) A disposal rate that is faster than the institution rate.

(iii) Proportional infrastructure.

(ii) Timely filling of sanctioned posts.

By itself, the amendment does not meet any of these conditions; it merely provides the legal framework necessary to meet them [7].

WHAT THE 2019 INCREASE REVEAL

The 2019 amendment, which increased the sanctioned strength from 30 to 338 judges provides the most relevant precedent for assessing the measurable impact of an increase in judicial strength[9].However, this does not mean that the 2019 increase failed to improve disposal capacity, as the number of cases disposed of increased significantly in absolute terms over the same period. Instead, it points to a more specific issue: the additional capacity created in 2019 was insufficient to keep pace with the growth in case institution[10] .The annual data indicates that it is not the number of judges that is the problem; it is the pace of new litigation relative to the rate at which additional judges can practically be appointed.[11]

The four additional posts created by the 2026 amendment would have to generate a substantial increase in disposal capacity beyond the current per-judge average, to close the recurring gap between case institution and disposal.[12] Such an approach would be impractical if it did not take into consideration other factors not covered by the amendment: the categorisation of cases, filtering at the stage of admission, and the procedural improvements.[13]

BEYONF PENDENCY: STRENGTHENING CONSTITUION BENCHES

The obvious institutional advantage of the amendment lies elsewhere. Under Article 145(3), at least five judges are required to sit on the Constitution Bench, and during such proceedings, those judges are not available for ordinary appellate work. [14] With 33 judges, even one such Constitution Bench can place significant pressure on the Court’s capacity to hear regular cases. Increasing the sanctioned strength of the Court to 37 judges will allow the Chief Justice to constitute larger Constitution Benches, including seven or nine judge Benches, without significantly reducing the judicial capacity available for ordinary appellate work[15]. This Represents a genuine and distinct institution benefit in the distribution of judicial work rather than a direct contribution to the overall rate of disposal or reduction in pendency.[16] The importance of this benefit should neither be underestimated by focusing solely on disposal rates nor overstated as direct mechanism for reducing pendency.[17]

The constitutional stakes of delay in court are not an administrative matter. Though the case concerned the right to a speedy trial in a criminal proceeding, it is settled that the right to speedy trial is a constitutional right, not merely an administrative convenience, thus creating a higher benchmark for assessment of any capacity enhancing measure18. To create posts is to meet a legislative obligation and to make them work as intended is to live up to the underlying constitutional commitment.[19]

CONCLUSION

The 2026 amendment should be assessed on two grounds. Its effectiveness in reducing total pendency depends on three requirements, as reflected in Imtiyaz Ahmad, All India Judges' Association, and Malik Mazhar Sultan: timely appointments, appropriate infrastructure, and a substantial increase in annual disposal capacity, which the 2019 increases did not achieve to a sufficient extent [20]. The amendment, as part of the attempt to expand the capacity of the Constitution Benches under Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India, should be assessed on its own merits, as it has sought a gain in terms of enhanced strength in the Constitution Bench by adding additional judges without any agreed compensation to ordinary judges. The danger is that we might condemn the amendment in advance for failing to resolve the backlog problem and equally, credit it in advance for a structural change that is not primarily about backlog. The more relevant measure of the amendment's effectiveness is not pendency alone but the institution disposal gap, which should be assessed over the next two or three years as the new posts are filled [21].What will matter is the speed with which the appointments are made; if thegap does not close and keeps widening, it will be due to a lack of infrastructure or a failure to achieve the desired targets at the institutions, rather than the number of sanctioned posts alone.

REFERNCES

1. India Const. art. 124, cl. 1.

2. Id.

3. All India Judges’ Ass’n v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247.

4. Law Comm'n of India, Arrears and Backlog: Creating Additional Judicial (wo)manpower, Report No. 245 (2014); Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of U.P., (2017) 3 SCC 658, 665–66.

5. All India Judges' Ass'n v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247.

6. Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, (2008) 17 SCC 703.

7. All India Judges' Ass'n v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247; Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,(2008) 17 SCC 703.8. The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2019, No. 37 of 2019, § 2 (India).

9. Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956, No. 55 of 1956 (India), as amended by the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2019.

10. Supreme Court of India, Annual Report (providing data concerning institution and disposal of cases).

11. Supreme Court of India, Indian Judiciary: Annual Report 2023–24, at 109–18 (2024).

12 Id.

13. All India Judges' Ass'n v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247.

14. India Const. art. 145(3).

15. Id.

16. All India Judges' Ass'n v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247.

17 .Id.

18. Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Sec'y, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81.

19. Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Sec'y, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81; All India Judges' Ass'n v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247.

20. Supreme Court of India, Indian Judiciary:Annual Report 2023–24, at 111–15 (2024).

21. Id.