Redefining Equality under Article 14: Non-Biological Motherhood & Statutory Leave Entitlements
The law relating to maternity benefits in India has traditionally been based on a biological approach. Welfare provisions have been conceived from the standpoint of post-natal recovery following childbirth, and care-giving responsibilities have been conceived only as a subsidiary aspect of biological reproduction.
Introduction
The law relating to maternity benefits in India has traditionally been based on a biological approach. Welfare provisions have been conceived from the standpoint of post-natal recovery following childbirth, and care-giving responsibilities have been conceived only as a subsidiary aspect of biological reproduction. But in a historic judgment in Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India 1, the Supreme Court of India unsettled this traditional approach by declaring Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 2 (parallel to Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961)3 to be unconstitutional on account of its age limit of three months for adoptive maternity leave as violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution 4. By equating adoption with biological parenthood and treating both as exercises of equal rights under Article 21, the Court has revolutionised the constitutional scope of equality under Article 14.
I. Statutory Framework & the Arbitrary Classification under Section 60(4)
Initially impugned in W.P.(C) No. 960 of 2021 as Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (as amended in 2017), the provision was converted to Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, after the Code came into force. The provision limited the statutory entitlement to 12-week maternity leave only to an adoptive mother who adopted a child “below the age of three months” 5. In pursuance of this statutory scheme, adoptive mothers were unnecessarily segregated into two different classes: mothers who adopt a child below the age of three months are entitled to the statutory benefit of 12 weeks of leave after adopting the child, while mothers who adopt a child above the age of three months are not entitled to any maternity leave at all. It goes without saying that although the intention behind social security statutes is to uphold the dignity of motherhood and ensure child welfare, the aforementioned time limit gave rise to an arbitrary segregation of adoptive mothers. The test of reasonableness of classification, established in State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar 6 and relied upon in State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. 7 , demands that:
● Intelligible Differentia: It must be founded on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes persons or things that are grouped from others left out of the group.
● Rational Nexus: The differentia must have a rational relation to the primary legislative objective sought to be achieved.
A Bench consisting of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan pointed out that restricting leave entitlements based on the child's age would meet neither criterion. The main purpose of the maternity benefit scheme is to assist the child-carer, promote emotional attachment, and ensure the child's full integration. For an adoptive mother who brings an older child into her home, her integration needs are equal to, if not more than, those of a mother adopting an infant. Through this under-inclusive classification, the provision arbitrarily denied statutory benefits to mothers adopting children above three months old.
II. Decoupling Motherhood from Biology under Article 14
Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality and requires the state to treat like cases alike.
Social welfare laws have traditionally given priority to biological mothers, considering physical constraints and post-natal recuperation needs. But as stated in Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) 8,and reiterated in Deepika Singh v. PGIMER, Chandigarh 9,social welfare legislation must evolve with changing family structures. By stating that “a mother takes birth the day a child comes into her life” 10, the Bench established key constitutional principles:
● Substantive Equality over Formal Equality: Article 14 requires the law to recognise the equal status of non-biological parents. Distinguishing between biological and adoptive mothers or between adoptive mothers based on the child's age treats equal caregiving obligations unequally.
● Functional View of Parenting: The core function of maternity leave shifts from physical recuperation to relational nurture. Motherhood is recognised as a gradual emotional process that takes shape outside the womb, making the bond formed in adoptive families as crucial as biological parentage.
III. Broadening Reproductive Rights under Article 21
The constitutional foundation of this judgment rests on a broadened interpretation of Article 21, particularly regarding personal liberties, dignity, and reproductive rights. Following the precedent set in X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi)11 authored by Justice Pardiwala, and cases like K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India 12 and Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn. 13, the Court reiterated the notion that reproductive rights pertain not only to the physical act of procreation but decisional autonomy in forming families as well.
Although statutes may recognise surrogacy law, the language of Section 60(4)14 makes the three- month age limit specific to adoption rights, not to commissioning mothers. Thus, the constitutional challenge and the Court’s striking down of the age limit pertained only to adoptive mothers. This broadened interpretation of Article 21 provides for reproductive rights along the following two important axes:
● Biological Reproduction: Encompassing choices related to procreation, pregnancy, and biological childbirth.
● Non-Biological Choices: Encompassing choices such as adoption, which represents an equally protected decisional right to form a family and exercise parental autonomy.
1. Decisional Autonomy in Family Formation
Reproductive autonomy is not limited to the biological act of procreation. Choosing to form a family through adoption represents a conscious, meaningful exercise of individual autonomy protected under Article 21. An atypical or unconventional familial setup cannot strip away guaranteed constitutional rights.
2. Comparative Law Foundations & The Best Interest of the Child
The court supported its analysis of Article 21 and the “best interest of the child” principles with persuasive comparative law precedents, including international case law such as Werner Van Wyk v. Minister of Employment and Labour15 (Constitutional Court of South Africa) and Topčić- Rosenberg v. Croatia16 (European Court of Human Rights). The precedent-based comparative law supports the duty to secure non-discriminatory integration of children into adoptive families. The ruling emphasises the link between the mother’s right to raise the child and the child’s right to holistic nurturing. The “best interest of the child” doctrine, enshrined in Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India 17 and the CARA regulations 18, imposes a continuing duty to secure family reunification. Denial of maternity leave implies deprivation of the adopted child of the necessary parental attention in the crucial initial period.
IV. Practical Unworkability & Judicial Redrafting
However, in light of statutory adoption procedures, the Court also considered the three-month requirement impractical. In the context of laws outlined in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 19, and the CARA Regulations, timelines for declaring a child “legally free for adoption” which include mandatory inquiry and reconsideration periods generally extend beyond two to three months.Therefore, in practicality, children who are legally free for adoption are usually older than three months. Based on the principle laid down in State of Kerala v. Unni 20, where a statutory provision resulting in practical absurdity or impossibility may be read down or struck down, the Court determined that Section 60(4) rendered the statutory benefit illusory and otiose. To remedy this constitutional problem, the Division Bench composed of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan in Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India read down Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 (and Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961). Finding the three-month age cap violative of Articles 14 and 21, the Court granted operative relief by declaring that: “A woman who legally adopts a child or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over”21
V. Paternity Leave: Obiter & Recommendatory Observations
While discussing the ratio decidendi of this case, it is important to consider the Court’s other observations about the gender dynamics at play behind statutory leave for caregiving. As compared to the ratio decidendi, which is the mandatory ruling declaring Section 60(4) unconstitutional under Articles 14 and 2122, the Bench has made some non-mandatory observations in its judgment regarding men’s right to leave for caregiving.
• Recommendation of the Bench: The Bench has recommended that the Union Government must recognise paternity leave as a social security benefit. 23
• Dismantling Gender Stereotypes: The Court has observed that making a woman alone responsible for the post-adoption care can perpetuate gender stereotypes because it is important for the proper development of the children that the fathers also take care of the children.
Conclusion
The case of Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India is important because the Court has updated the labour and constitutional jurisprudence of India by decoupling social security benefits for caregivers from biological necessities. The Court has declared that adoption is also a reproductive and decision-making right guaranteed under Article 21. Striking down the arbitrary three-month age cap aligns statutory welfare schemes with the substantive equality guarantees of Article 14, ensuring that social security protections extend to all adoptive mothers and children regardless of how their family unit is formed.
REFERENCES
1 Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 960 of 2021, 2026 INSC 246 (India).
2 The Code on Social Security, No. 36 of 2020, § 60(4) (India).
3 Maternity Benefit Act, No. 53 of 1961, § 5(4) (India), as inserted by Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, No. 6 of 2017, § 2 (India).
4 India Const. arts. 14, 21.
5 Code on Soc. Sec. § 60(4) (India).
6 State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, (1952) 1 S.C.C. 1 (India).
7 State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 S.C.C. 656 (India).
8 Mun. Corp. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll), (2000) 3 S.C.C. 224 (India).
9 Deepika Singh v. PGIMER, Chandigarh, (2023) 13 S.C.C. 681 (India).
10 Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 246, 116 (India).
11 X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 9 S.C.C. 433 (India).
12 K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 S.C.C. 1 (India).
13 Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admin., (2009) 9 S.C.C. 1 (India).
14 Code on Soc. Sec. § 60(4) (India).
15 Van Wyk v. Minister of Emp. & Lab., [2025] ZACC 20 (S. Afr.).
16 Topčić-Rosenberg v. Croatia, App. No. 19391/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 14, 2013).
17 Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.C. 244 (India).
18 Adoption Regulations, 2022 (India).
19 Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, No. 2 of 2016 (India).
20 State of Kerala v. Unni, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 365 (India).
21 Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 246, 168 (India).
22 Id. at 166.
23 Id. at 169.